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Wednesday, September 12, 2007
Hugh Hewitt :: Townhall.com Columnist
9/11 Anniversary: What’s the Future for al Qaeda?
by Hugh Hewitt
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On the sixth anniversary of 9/11, Hugh Hewitt, host of the nationally syndicated “Hugh Hewitt Show,” interviewed Pulitzer Prize winning author of “The Looming Tower: al Qaeda and the Road to 9/11” Lawrence Wright about General Petraeus’s report on the Iraq war, the new bin Laden videotape and the global threat of al Qaeda. 

Hugh Hewitt: We’re talking on the 6th anniversary of 9/11. In the six years since they launched the successful attack on America, Lawrence Wright, how is al Qaeda faring in the world? 

Lawrence Wright: Well, it’s a mixed report. You know, al Qaeda central has been, to some extent, reduced, isolated. It’s been unable to accomplish many of its major goals, especially capturing a Muslim country, and restoring the caliphate and creating a kind of theocratic law. That it’s failed to do. But on the other hand, essentially after November/December, 2001, after the Tora Bora battle, al Qaeda was pretty much a zombie. It was over. The war on terror was at an end, and it’s been amazing to see how that organization has been able to reconstitute itself. It’s now deeply rooted in a lot of countries where it wasn’t present before. The banner of al Qaeda has been taken up by a lot of disaffected young Muslims around the world who hadn’t been interested in it before. So on balance, I think it’s as dangerous as it was before 9/11, but in different ways.

Hewitt: What does the new bin Laden transcript tell you—the videotape that he released last week? 

Wright: Well, it’s a peculiar document. For one thing, I’m always amused by his kind of commentary on American politics, and you know, averting to the Kyoto treaty and stuff like that where he does this kind of second-rate commentary on the American political scene. I think that the message that he wants to get out is that he’s still a threat, he’s still relevant. I think he’s probably not capable of carrying out the high-scale attacks that he has accomplished in the past, but he wants us to think that [he is]. And so by rattling the cages periodically, he accomplishes at least keeping us unnerved.  

Hewitt: There is some concern that he signals awakening of sleeper cells with this. Does that still concern intelligence agencies that you stay in touch with, Lawrence Wright? 

Wright: Well, it concerns me in that I know…the title of my book, for instance, “The Looming Tower,” was a quotation that bin Laden used three times in a speech that was found on the hijacker’s computer, and I suspect that that was a go-ahead signal. So I am concerned that he may use, and Zawahiri as well, the number two man, use the public media as a way of communicating with his followers.  

Hewitt: [bin Laden] has a theory of American character that posited we would run away as soon as we took a series of blows. Is the anger towards Bush in this most recent document the fact that the one thing he thought he knew best about the West has just proven not to be the case? 

Wright: No, I think that he is frustrated that we’re still in Iraq. And honestly, Hugh, there’s a … I think al Qaeda’s a little frustrated in Iraq as well. That’s where al Qaeda’s preoccupied, and where it’s been pouring all of its resources, and it doesn’t have much to show for it, either. It’s been, frankly, a draw.

Al Qaeda is in a great public relations situation, whereas if we withdraw, then they can say that they won, and that they defeated the other superpower. And if we stay, then Iraq is still a beacon for disaffected jihadis who want to go join the war. So they are in an enviable position, but really, they haven’t accomplished what they hope to do in Iraq. 

Hewitt: Where is [al Qaeda’s] money coming from? One of the compelling narratives in “The Looming Tower” is how bin Laden was stunned when the King arranged for him to be cut off and disappropriated of his family’s fortune, and how broke he was. Where’s their money coming from now? Continued...

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About The Author

Hugh Hewitt is a law professor, broadcast journalist, and author of several books including A Mormon in the White House?: 110 Things Every American Should Know about Mitt Romney.

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Subject: Col. McMaster
I kind of chopped things up a bit when trying to edit before hitting the comment button.

Col. McMaster served in Iraq previous to Gen. Petraeus being given authority over our efforts there. He was given autonomy for his area of responsibility in Iraq. It was his success in putting the Counter-Insurgency methods which were covered in Gen. Petraeus' book on the subject, which led to serious debate over the effectiveness of the "Small Footprint" strategies which had been supported by Rumsfeld and those in authority in the Pentagon. (This is not a condemnation of Rumsfeld, btw. It was a bill of goods sold to Rumsfeld and the President.)

The successes in parts of South Vietnam in the reduction of insurgencies there using similar techniques--as cited by Petraeus in his book--were ignored by Westmoreland and the higher ranks of "Military Intelligence".

Thus, as with every other war in which we found ourselves, we were prepared for the previous one. Except in this case, the lessons were not learned from Vietnam or Korea. The first Gulf War, and the invasion which removed Saddam from power were brilliantly planned and executed battles from WW-II! (With updated equipment.)

The planning from the Pentagon did not reflect the conditions of the present-day speed of communications, of the press, or of the sophistication and speed at which an insurgency could be organized, supplied, and fight. Being composed mostly of REMFs the first thing all of these General Officers did was CYA. They did so with the speed and efficiency which should have been the trademark of post-Saddam Iraq.

Part III
Even though no one is likely to read this, I'll go on a bit longer.

What about Bagdad?

Essentially, for that particular situation, they are making it up as they go along.

While there is actual experience in rebuilding effective local governments at the village to small city level (under the conditions of insugency,) no one has experience in doing so to such a large one as Bagdad. Nor one so complicated by the ties of religion, tribe, and family as they exist in the ME. The situations in the Cities of Europe and Japan were not so complicated--so far as logistics, there is experience, but not for the social conditions of Bagdad.

And, so far as the questions involving the number of enemy dead--they are irrelevant as well. Patraeus is not Westmoreland or MacNamera.

His estimation of success: Requires the creation of a social climate which will lead to the expulsion and exposure of insurgents for destruction or arrest. And, to create a social environment which will lead to the expulsion of corrupted police, politicians, and Military officials from their defense forces and government.

Both of these things are very difficult to quantify to the MORONS IN CONGRESS.

Eric
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